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MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
OUTDATED STANDARD OF DEFERENCE:
WEISS v. UNITED STATES
KAREN A. RuzIc*
INTRODUCTION
The general public often views the military as a hierarchical and
rigid system that imposes its ideology and method of operation on
members who blindly obey orders. Such notions may lead to a per-
ception by civilians and servicemembers alike that the military treats
its members unfairly. This viewpoint is reflected in the oft quoted say-
ing that "military justice is to justice as military music is to music."'
Thus, the military has been traditionally regarded as a "separate soci-
ety" that mandates a different system of justice for those members of
society who choose to serve in their country's military.2
This "separate society" view, however, is no longer an accurate
view of the modem day military establishment. In its present peace-
time form, the military functions much like a large civilian corpora-
tion, with officers playing the role of managers and enlisted personnel
playing the role of employees. Both the public's and the Supreme
Court's perceptions, however, have not caught up with the changes in
the military. In fact, the Supreme Court still takes a "hands off" posi-
tion when dealing with military issues.
In Weiss v. United States,3 for example, the Supreme Court again
followed its traditional approach of adhering to the "separate society"
doctrine. The Court applied a standard of review highly deferential to
Congress since this case, after all, involved a military issue. In doing
so, it declined to extend constitutional protections, enjoyed by civilian
judges, to members of the armed forces. The Court found both that
military judges did not need a second appointment and that they did
not need fixed terms of office to ensure impartiality.4 Had the Court
been less deferential to the military and more willing to explore the
* Third-year law student, Chicago-Kent College of Law
1. See, e.g., ROBERT SHERRIL, MILITARY JUSTICE Is TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC Is To
Music (1970).
2. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974).
3. 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994).
4. Id.
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realities of today's military establishment, it would surely have arrived
at different conclusions.
This Note will discuss the merits of treating the military as a "sep-
arate society" and will argue that the modem military does not differ
greatly from civilian society. Part I of this Note will give an overview
of the history of the military judicial system. Part II will give a back-
ground of the military court structure. Part III will continue with an
account of the Court's opinion in Weiss. Finally, this Note concludes
with a discussion of the realities of today's military and argues that
such realities render the Court's rationale for a high degree of defer-
ence obsolete.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY LAW
A. From Roman Times to Anglo Tradition
Military judges existed at least as early as the Roman Empire.
Their jurisdiction resembles that of a modern day court-martial, as
Roman soldiers were subject to the court's full jurisdiction over crimi-
nal and even civil matters.5 In fact, the general rule in Roman times
was that no wrong could exist without a remedy. Thus, if the civilian
courts did not take action in a particular case, the military courts
would. If fact, in time of war, civilian courts yielded all power to mili-
tary tribunals.6
Following the Middle Ages, and the development of more elabo-
rate forms of government, nations began to recognize civil rights and
liberties. As a result, the jurisdiction of military courts gave way to
the increased authority and scope of their civilian counterparts. 7 Nev-
ertheless, in time of war, entire societies would fall subject to martial
rule at the hands of a conqueror.8 Even today, the use of martial rule
remains a potential reality.9
History tells us that the jurisdiction of the military over soldiers
may have been codified as early as the reigns of Richard II, Henry V,
and Henry VII, and courts-martial tribunals may have convened in the
5. Henry W. Halleck, Military Tribunals and their Jurisdiction, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 958 (1911),
reprinted in DEPr. OF THE ARmy, MLrrARY LAW REVIEW BICENTENNIAL ISSUE 15 (1975).
6. Id. at 16.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 19. Article 1, § 9 of the United States Constitution provides for martial rule. In
cases of national emergency, the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended. For a discussion of an
incident of martial rule in the United States see Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military
Jurisdiction: Martial Rule in Hawaii and the Yamashita Case, 46 HARv. L. REV. 833 (1946),
reprinted in DEPT. oF THE ARMY, MILxrARY LAW REVtEW BICENTENNIAL ISSUE 97 (1975).
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time of William the Conqueror.' 0 These early tribunals were called
either the Court of Honour or the Court of Chivalry and had jurisdic-
tion over all military offenses." The head of these courts was the
Lord High Constable. 12 Over time, these courts came under the au-
thority of Earl Marshal. Under the new name of Courts of the Mar-
shal,13 they continued to operate well into the 17th Century, with the
advice of a civilian lawyer.14
It was during the 17th Century that the title of Judge Advocate
came into use, and in 1629 that the first Articles of War were written.
Issued by the Crown, the Articles specifically gave the Judge Advo-
cate jurisdiction over soldiers.' 5 Later in the 17th Century, the army
wrote the Mutiny Acts and continually rewrote them well into the
19th Century. It was under the Mutiny Acts that the procedures were
first developed for courts-martial proceedings.' 6
In 1881, the Army Act combined the Articles of War and the Mu-
tiny Acts into one system of military law. With an occasional revision,
this system continued into the 20th Century.' 7 For example, in 1923,
the Military Department of the Judge Advocate General was created
and authorized to perform prosecutorial functions.' 8 Then, in 1938, a
committee was formed to assure judicial independence, thereby re-
quiring that the prosecutorial and judicial bodies be subject to the au-
thority of different Ministers.' 9
B. Beginnings of the American Military System
On June 14, 1775, the Continental Congress appointed a commit-
tee to establish the rules and regulations for the army, and adopted
the American Articles of War.20 These original articles bore a strong
10. James Stuart-Smith, Military Law: Its History, Administration and Practice, 85 LAW Q.
REV. 478 (1969), reprinted in DEPT. OF THE ARMY, MILITARY LAW REVIEW BICENTENNIAL IS-
SUE 25, 27-28 (1975).
11. Id.
12. Id. In 1521, the Lord High Constable was beheaded for disagreeing with the King. Nev-
ertheless, these courts continued to function and were later called Courts of the Marshal. Id.
13. Id. The court name was later shortened to Courts of Marshal and eventually evolved
into the modem term courts-martial. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 29. The first recorded Judge Advocate General was Samuel Barrow in 1666. Id.
16. Id. at 26-27.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 32.
19. Id. at 32-33.
20. Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitutior The Original Understand-
ing, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1957), reprinted in DEPT. OF THE ARMY, MILITARY LAW REVIEW
BICENTENNIAL ISSUE 141, 145 (1975).
1994]
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resemblance to their British namesake. 21 Under this early system,
Congress was given ultimate authority over the military.22 The early
avowal of civilian control over the military would prove to be a con-
tinuing theme in the new nation, sparking major concern and
controversy.
The experience of the Revolutionary War provided the back-
ground of what would become the "standing army" debate at the Con-
stitutional Convention over whether to have a standing army or a
militia. Having rebelled against oppressive British military rule, many
citizens feared the maintenance of a peacetime army.23 At the same
time, however, some citizens saw the War as evidence that a strong
standing army was needed in the new nation.24 Thus, the standing
army debate was born, and the lines were drawn between federalists,
who favored a professional military, and anti-federalists, who favored
a militia.25
The distrust of a standing army resulted in a careful diffusion of
the war powers. 26 While the President would be Commander-in-Chief
of the military forces, Congress would have various checks on the
President's power. Thus, Article I gave Congress the powers "to raise
and support"27 an army, "to provide and maintain a Navy," 2  "to
make Rules for the Government and [the] Regulation" 29 of the forces,
and to "make all Laws ... necessary and proper" 30 for the mainte-
21. Id. Revisions were made to the Articles in 1776, but the system remained in effect until
the Constitutional Convention. Id. at 145-48.
22. Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference That is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judi-
cial Deference to the Military, 35 VILLE L. REV. 1009, 1032 (1990). The founders created this
system in the midst of the Revolutionary War. Given the attitude of the day against the British
military, it is not surprising that the founders would immediately set about the task of controlling
their own military, subjugating it to Congressional control. Although the framers said little
about military justice specifically, they were quite concerned with civilian checks on the military.
This concern would play itself out in the ratification debates. Honorable Walter T. Cox III, The
Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4
(1987).
23. Levin, supra note 22, at 1024. The colonialists had experienced the hierarchical, highly
disciplined military of the British and feared its use as a political tool for the head of govern-
ment. It was also seen as an instrument of the class system, with the aristocracy dominating the
officer corp and subjecting the lower classes to their place in the ranks. Id. at 1024-25.
24. Id. at 1031.
25. Id. at 1031-35. The anti-federalist/federalist debate over the standing army issue was
symbolic of the entire philosophical chasm between these two groups. The federalists favored a
strong, centralized government while the anti-federalists championed states' rights and decen-
tralized power. Id. at 1044-45.
26. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181 (1962), reprinted
in DEPT. OF TuE ARMy, MILxTARY LAW REVIEW BICENTENNIAL ISSUE 249, 252 (1975).
27. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 13.
29. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
30. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
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nance of the military establishment. For our purposes, the practical
effect was to give Congress authority over the trial and punishment of
military offenses, independent of the judicial power of Article 111.31
Herein lies the American tradition of a separate military subject to
civilian authority.32
This distribution of power, however, did not entirely allay the
tension between individual rights and military necessity, and the ongo-
ing debate carried over into the fight for the Bill of Rights.33 The
rights of civilians against the potential for military encroachment are
clearly espoused in the Constitution.34 Nonetheless, intense debate
has continued over the applicability of the Bill of Rights to individual
members of the military. An understanding of the court-martial sys-
tem, its development, its procedures, and its purposes, will aid in our
discussion of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to servicemembers.
Under the Articles of War, courts-martial were handled by the
commander of the unit,35 but until 1920, no level of appellate review
was available.36 During World War II, the ranks of the army included
more "regular" citizens than ever before. Some of these citizens were
lawyers who were shocked at the military justice system's potential for
unfair treatment. 37 A cry for reform led to the short-lived Elston Act
in 1948. The only major development to result from that act was the
creation of the Judge Advocate General's Corps.38 However, the
seeds for reform were planted, and following World War II, in con-
junction with unification of the armed forces under the Department of
Defense, a call for a uniform system of justice arose.
In 1948, newly appointed Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal,
appointed a committee to work on a uniform code of military jus-
tice.39 The committee was charged with integrating the system of jus-
31. Cox, supra note 22, at 3 (citing Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857)).
32. Warren, supra note 26, at 251. In his article, the author points out that the supremacy of
civilian representatives over the military has survived in our country without any period of sub-
mission to military control.
33. Levin, supra note 22, at 1012. In fact, the author argues, the standing army debate was
one of the primary reasons the Bill of Rights was created. See also Warren, supra note 26, at 253.
34. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. II (right to bear arms); U.S. CoNsT. amend. III (right to
refuse quartering of soldiers).
35. John Murawski, Putting Military-Style Justice on Tria" Attacking a System in which
Prosecutors Judge the Judges, THE RECORDER, May 12, 1993, at 1. Thus, a servicemember ap-
peared before the very officer responsible for convening the court-martial.
36. See Joseph E. Ross, The Military Justice Act of 1968: Historical Background, 28 JAG J.
125 (1969), reprinted in DEPT. OF THE ARMy, MILITARY LAW REVIEw BICENTENNIAL ISSUE 273,
276 (1975).
37. Cox, supra note 22, at 11.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Id. at 13.
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tice for each branch of the military, modernizing the system without
impeding the military function, and improving on the Articles of
War.40 The end result was the adoption, in May 1950, of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice ("Code").4' Included in the new Code were
the addition of law officers42 to hear courts-martial cases, the addition
of counsel for the accused in bad conduct discharge cases,43 and the
creation of the Court of Military Appeals to ensure civilian review of
military cases.44
Throughout the 1950's and 60's, the Code Committee 45 met and
proposed revisions to the Code. Sam J. Erwin, Jr., for example, pro-
posed amendments to the Code in June 1968.46 The Department of
Defense made several objections to these amendments, 47 but after
some modification, Congress passed the Military Justice Act of 1968.48
Of particular significance were the establishment of Courts of Military
Review as an intermediate appellate court for each branch of the mili-
tary,49 the creation of military judges at both the trial and appellate
level, and the guarantee of trained legal counsel to handle the prose-
cution and defense in all courts-martial proceedings. 50 Congress en-
acted one other major revision in 1984. The result was to subject
certain decisions of the Court of Military Appeals to Supreme Court
review.51
40. Id (citing Letter from James Forrestal to the Committee on Uniform Code of Military
Justice (Aug. 18, 1948), reprinted in I Morgan Papers).
41. Id. at 14.
42. Law officers, while acting in the capacity of a judge, were not formally trained lawyers.
Ross, supra note 36, at 276.
43. Id.
44. Cox, supra note 22, at 14-15. This codification of appellate courts was a significant step
for military justice. The original Articles of War made no provision for appellate review. It was
not until the reforms in 1920 that "appellate" boards of review were enacted by Congress. Fred
L. Borch, Arming Military Justice, 138 MIL. L. Rev. 263, 264-65 (1992) (book review).
45. The Code Committee was established by Article 37(g) of the Code. The Committee
was to meet annually to discuss and propose changes to the Code. Ross, supra note 36, at 273-
74. Several civilian agencies also contributed to the discourse on revision of the Code. Among
them were the American Legion and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Id. at
276-77.
46. Id. at 279.
47. Id. at 279-80.
48. Id. at 280. The Act was enacted on October 24, 1968. For a more comprehensive de-
scription of the Erwin Amendments, the Department of Defense objections, and a list of the
Code provisions affected by the Military Justice Act, see id. at 279-81.
49. Murawski, supra note 35, at 1.
50. Cox, supra note 22, at 19.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3) (Supp. IV 1992); 10 U.S.C. § 867(h) (Supp. IV 1993). In fact, the
circumstances in which cases qualify for certiorari are quite limited. Those circumstances in-
clude: cases resulting in the death penalty approved by one of the four Courts of Military Re-
view, cases which the Judge Advocate General has certified to the Court of Military Appeals,
[Vol. 70:265
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE COURT-MARTIAL SYSTEM
A. Structure of the Court-Martial System
The basic difference between Article 152 and Article II153 courts
lies in the guarantee of judicial independence. Federal Courts estab-
lished under Article III require tenure and salary protection for fed-
eral court judges; those protections help to ensure that judges are
impartial and independent. Although Congress has the power to ex-
tend these Article III protections to Article I courts, it has declined to
do so with regard to military courts; this decision has been upheld by
the Supreme Court.5 4
A military trial court, known as a court-martial, is a court of gen-
eral criminal jurisdiction,5 5 created by Congress pursuant to Article I,
Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to reg-
ulate the armed forces.56 The jurisdiction of these trial courts extends
to all active duty military personnel who have committed either a mili-
tary or a civilian crime.57 However, it is not a standing court, but an ad
hoc tribunal convened by the commander of a unit whenever a crime
has been committed.5 8
At the trial level, military courts are substantially different from
civil courts in both structure and procedure. Judges serving at the
court-martial level are appointed at the discretion of the Judge Advo-
and cases in which the Court of Military Appeals has either granted a petition for review, or
granted relief. Id.
52. Article I, § 8, sets out powers granted to Congress with regard to the military. Among
these powers are the power to "raise and support armies," to "provide and maintain a Navy," to
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," and to "make
all Laws... necessary and proper" for carrying out these powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
53. Article III states in pertinent part: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
54. Note, Military Justice and Article III, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1909, 1914 (1990) (citing Dynes
v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857)).
55. Frederick B. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72
HARv. L. REv. 1,266 (1958), reprinted in DarT. OF THE ARMY, MILrrARY LAW REVIEw BICEN-
TENNIAL ISSUE 171, 242 (1975).
56. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
57. See infra section IV(B)(2) for a discussion on the expansion of court-martial
jurisdiction.
58. In fact, there are three distinct types of courts-martial proceedings. Military judges pre-
side over special and general courts-martial proceedings. Summary courts-martial proceedings
may be convened and adjudicated by a commissioned officer. A finding of guilty in a general
courts-martial proceeding may result in a sentence of death, life imprisonment, imprisonment for
a number of years, forfeiture of pay and allowances, reductions in pay grade, and/or a dishonora-
ble discharge. UCMJ Art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818. Sentences which may be imposed at a special
court-martial include up to six months confinement, forfeiture of up to two-thirds pay per month




cate General (JAG),59 and because military courts are established
through Congress' Article I powers, military judges do not enjoy Arti-
cle III protections at either the trial or the appellate level. Military
judges do not enjoy the protections afforded civilian judges in the
form of life tenure, a fixed term, or even a distinct position. Addition-
ally, the jury in a military trial may contain less than twelve jurors, and
their decision need not be unanimous.60 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court long ago upheld the constitutionality of the court-martial
system.61
At the appellate level, each branch of the service has a Court of
Military Review.62 All courts-martial cases resulting in the imposition
of the death-penalty, in the discharge from the armed services, or in
confinement for more than one year, are automatically reviewed by
this Court.63 Judges serving on Courts of Military Review may be
either civilians or commissioned officers, provided, however, that they
are members of a bar.64 Although they serve on permanent courts,65
these judges, like their trial level counterparts, are appointed by the
JAG.66 Moreover, they are not appointed for fixed terms of office,
leaving their status subject to the JAG under which they serve.67
The highest court in the military justice system is the United
States Court of Military Appeals. Also an Article I court, it consists
of five civilian judges68 who have been appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.69 These judges serve fif-
teen year terms and enjoy the salary of a federal court judge.70 There
is no direct appeal to this court. Rather, to reach the Court of Mili-
59. Military Justice and Article III, supra note 54, at 1911-12.
60. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979)(allowing nonunanimous finding if the jury
is composed of more than six persons). In cases where the death penalty is a mandatory punish-
ment, however, the UCMJ specifically requires a unanimous verdict: "No person may be con-
victed of an offense for which the death penalty is made mandatory by law, except by the
concurrence of all the members of the court-martial present at the time the vote is taken."
UCMJ Art. 52, 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1).
61. Military Justice and Article III, supra note 54, at 1914 (citing Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 65 (1857)).
62. UCMJ Art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (1988).
63. UCMJ Art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1).
64. UCMJ Art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a).
65. Brief of Petitioners at 9, Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994) (No. 92-1482).
66. Id.
67. Id. For a further discussion of military judges fixed terms of office, see discussion infra
section Ill(B) and accompanying notes.
68. UCMJ Art. 42, 10 U.S.C. § 942(a) (Supp. V. 1993). Although Court of Military Appeals
judges are appointed from civilian life, they are typically individuals with prior military experi-
ence. Currently, all five judges on the court have such prior experience.
69. UCMJ Art. 142, 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(1).
70. UCMJ Art. 142, 10 U.S.C. § 942.
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tary Appeals, cases must first be adjudicated at the Court of Military
Review level.71 Moreover, while the Supreme Court can now review
military cases, it typically can only do so where a case has first been
heard by the Court of Military Appeals.72 Thus, this Court plays a
unique screening role in the military justice system.73
Since its establishment in 1950,74 the status of the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals as an Article I, rather than Article III, court has been
variously questioned by civilian and military sources alike. In 1987,
the Court of Military Appeals itself established a committee to study
and consider the court's role and status both as an instrument of jus-
tice and an instrument of the military.75 The committee, while making
various suggestions and recommendations for improvement, declined
to address the court's Article III status, deciding that the issue should
be left for later consideration.76
B. The Purpose of the Court-Martial System
Originally, the court-martial system was aimed at meeting the dis-
ciplinary needs of a commander. 77 Modem changes in the military
system of justice, however, have raised complaints that the system has
become too "civilianized. ' '78  The question remains, however,
whether the main goal of the system is the achievement of discipline
or the achievement of justice, and whether both of these interests can,
or should, be served by the military court system. 79
In the 1800's, court-martials were predominately an instrument to
enforce discipline in the ranks.80 The classical theory of military law
71. UCMJ Art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867(b). For a detailed discussion of the Court of Military
Appeals' practice regarding review of cases under Article 67, see William N. Early et al.,
USCMA and the Specified Issue: The Current Practice, 123 MIL. L. REV. 9 (1989).
72. UCMJ Art. 67a, 10 U.S.C. § 867a(a) (Supp. V. 1993).
73. Military Justice and Article III, supra note 54, at 1912-13.
74. UCMJ Art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1950) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 867 (Supp. V.
1993)).
75. W. Gary Jewell & Harry L. Williams, COMA Watch 1989, 128 MIL. L. REV. 115, 119
(1990).
76. Id. (citing United States Court of Military Appeals Committee Report, (1989)). The
committee commended the job the Court of Military Appeals was doing but made sixteen rec-
ommendations for improvement. For an in depth look at three of those recommendations, see
id
77. David A. Schlueter, The Twentieth Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Military Justice
for the 1990's - A Legal System Looking for Respect, 133 Mu. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1991).
78. The "civilianization" of the military justice system began with the enactment of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950 and continued with various statutory changes to that
system over the years. The effect of these changes has been to create a system that more closely
resembles its civilian counterpart. Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 759 (1994).
79. Id. at 759-60.
80. Cox, supra note 22, at 7.
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saw courts-martial as a tool of the Executive to maintain order and
discipline. 81 Even with the move to a more civilianized system, the
military is often seen as a "specialized society separate from civilian
society," 82 that accordingly warrants a separate system of justice. The
military continually points to the "separate community" doctrine to
justify the Supreme Court's application of a high degree of deference
to Congress in any case addressing military issues.
Justification for this separate community is based on "military ne-
cessity."'83 In other words, the military points to the need for a flexible
system of justice, which a commander can resort to quickly and defini-
tively to fulfill the objectives of military discipline and a sense of
duty. 84 Specifically, the separate community doctrine views the mili-
tary as a "distinct subculture" that requires the subordination of its
members. 85 This philosophy maintains that strict standards of alle-
giance are necessary for the military to accomplish its goal8 6 of de-
fending the nation from opposing forces. Thus, where the military's
needs conflict with the servicemember's individual rights, civilian
courts are not deemed competent to determine how to protect those
rights without decreasing military efficiency.8 7
The argument against a system of military justice focused on dis-
cipline and in favor of a system founded in justice, is based on both
procedural and substantive arguments. Procedurally, proponents for a
basis in justice argue that the system has already become more judi-
cially based, as evidenced by the creation of military judges88 and the
adoption of the federal rules of evidence. In addition, Congress ini-
tially changed the name of the military's highest court from Court of
81. S.T. Ansell, Military Justice, 5 COmELL L. Q. (1919), reprinted in DEfr. OF THE ARMYsv,
MiLuTARY LAW REVIEW BICENTENNIAL ISSUE 53, 57 (citing 1 W. Wm, rTRop, MiLITARY LAW 54
(18xx). See also W. WINTRuoP, MILrrARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 47-48 (2d ed. reprint 1920).
This view was consistent with the supremacy of the monarch, and Ansell believed this placed
courts-martial proceedings above the law. Ansell, supra, at 57-58. W. Winthrop was the fore-
most authority on military law in the 19th Century. Even today, his classical theory of military
law is often cited.
82. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). Parker was the first case in which the Supreme
Court expressly used this different standard of review for cases involving military issues. James
M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional
Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 187 (1984).
83. Gary M. Heil, Comment, Military Triers of Fact: A Needless Deprivation of Constitu-
tional Protections?, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 727, 734 (1982). Fulfilling the objectives of the military
demands discipline and a strong sense of duty. Id.
84. Military Justice and Article III, supra note 54, at 1909.
85. Hirschhorn, supra note 82, at 201.
86. Id. at 201-03.
87. Id. at 238.
88. UCMJ Art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826(b).
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Military Appeals to "United States Court of Military Appeals" to en-
sure that it would be regarded as a true federal court.89 Congress
again changed the court's name to "United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces" in 1994; perhaps again to "civilianize" the mili-
tary justice system.90 Even this court has recognized courts-martial as
a judicial proceeding, rather than an instrument of discipline.91
Hence, if it is a system of justice, it follows that judicial independence
should be secured. 92
Moreover, critics of the military's separate justice system ex-
pound the idea that morale and discipline would be better served by
fair treatment of servicemembers. 93 Were the system perceived as a
legitimate instrument of justice, the resulting respect and perception
of fairness would promote adherence to its regulations. 94 The military
itself has recognized that the goal is not to balance justice and disci-
pline, but rather to promote justice.95 Thus, the result of the proper
functioning of a court-martial will itself promote discipline.96 Accord-
ingly, discipline should be viewed as the result of, and not the justifica-
tion for, military justice proceedings.
Critics of military justice further contend that the very nature of
the military makes judicial independence even more necessary than in
civilian society. This concern is magnified by the absence of constitu-
tional protections of servicemembers' rights and the potential for un-
lawful command influence.
III. WEISS V. UNITED S-A TES
The Supreme Court has recently had its jurisdiction extended to
review decisions of the Military Court of Appeals. 97 Despite its ex-
panded jurisdiction, however, the Supreme Court has heard only two
cases since 1984. This, however, has not been due to a lack of chal-
lenges at the military appellate level. In fact, over 200 appeals alleg-
89. Schlueter, supra note 77, at 3.
90. 10 USC § 94(a)(1994). At the same time, Congress also changed the name of the
Courts of Military Review to the "Court of Criminal Appeals." 10 USC § 941(b)(1994).
91. Heil, supra note 83, at 742 (quoting Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Mili-
tary Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1402 (1973)).
92. Ansell, supra note 81, at 63. Ansell states that "justice cannot be achieved unless the
methods of the trial are themselves just." Id.
93. Cox, supra note 22, at 30.
94. Schlueter, supra note 77, at 11 (citing The Powell Report 11, 12 (1960), ("a study of the
military justice system by high-ranking Army officers in a report to the Secretary of the Army on
the status of the UCMJ")).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 51.
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ing appearances of impropriety in military proceedings have been
made to the Supreme Court.98 On May 24, 1993, the Supreme Court
finally opened its doors to a constitutional challenge that struck at the
very heart of military justice.99
A. Facts
The Weiss case arose out of the courts-martial proceedings
against two United States Marines. Weiss was found guilty of one
count of larceny, while the other petitioner, Hernandez, was found
guilty of possession, importation and distribution of cocaine. Petition-
ers' convictions were affirmed by the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Military Review. Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Military
Appeals'00 claiming that the judges lacked authority to convict them.
Their contention was based on the theories that (1) the judges' ap-
pointments violated the Appointments Clause,' 0' and (2) the judges'
lack of a fixed term of office violated the Due Process Clause. 02 The
court unanimously agreed that due process does not require a fixed
term of office for military judges, and a plurality of the court rejected
the Appointments Clause challenge. 103
Weiss v. United States'04 is representative of numerous cases re-
cently heard by military appellate courts and petitioned to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The basic issue before the Court was whether the
appointment of military judges at the trial and appellate level, by and
at the discretion of the JAG and without Article III protections, vio-
lates the Appointments Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
98. John Murawski, Military Justice System Heads for High Court-Review, LEGAL TIMES,
May 31, 1993, at 13.
99. United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J. 224 (C.M.A. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2412 (1993).
100. At the time of the court of Military Appeals' decision, Congress had not yet changed
the court's name. Therefore, the "Court of Military Appeals" has been retained in this section
to preserve historical accuracy.
101. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Article II, § 2, cl. 2, provides the method
for the appointment of officers of the United States. It states that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in The Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
102. Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 755 (1994).
103. Weiss, 36 MJ. at 234.
104. 114 S. Ct. 752. Together with Hernandez v. United States, also on certiorari to the same
court.
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cess Clause. 05 As such, this challenge to the military justice system
addressed both procedural and substantive constitutional issues.106
B. Lower Court's Opinion
The Court of Military Appeals' decision in Weiss was somewhat
fractured. First, it dispensed with Petitioners' Fifth Amendment due
process claim, based on its recent decision in United States v. Graf.107
Confronting the Appointments Clause issue, a plurality of the judges
upheld the convictions. While two of the judges determined the Ap-
pointments Clause is satisfied by the original appointment of a mili-
tary officer who is later made a judge, 08 the third judge joining in the
plurality concluded the Appointments Clause does not apply to the
military. 1°9 In separate dissents, Judge Sullivan and Judge Wiss recog-
nized that due to the many changes to the military justice system, mili-
tary judges' duties are distinct from the duties of other military
officers."10  Thus, they concluded a second appointment is
necessary."'
C. Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Appointments Clause Challenge
Although Petitioners presented two possible grounds for finding
an Appointments Clause violation,112 the Court concluded that the
present method of appointing military judges does not violate Article
II of the Constitution. Petitioners' first argument was that Congress
meant to require a separate appointment for military officers ap-
pointed as military judges.113 Petitioners argued that since Congress
has required military judges to have certain special qualifications, an
105. Weiss answered an issue raised in thirty-seven other summary rulings made by the Court
of Military Appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450 (C.M.A. 1992); United States v.
Smith, 37 M.J. 773 (A.C.M.R. 1993); United States v. Mitchell, 37 M.J. 903 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993).
106. Before addressing Petitioners' arguments, the Court pointed out an area on which both
parties agreed. Based on the duties and powers that military judges enjoy, both parties conceded
the status of military judges as "officers" of the United States. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 757 (citing
Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991) (concluding special trial judges of Tax Court are
officers); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (concluding that a person "exercising signifi-
cant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States')).
107. 35 M.J. 450 (where the court unanimously declined to find a due process requirement of
a fixed term of office for military judges).
108. Weiss, 36 M.J. at 234.
109. Id. (Crawford, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 240 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting); id. at 256 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Brief of Petitioners at 14-22, Weiss (No. 92-1482).
113. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 754.
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additional appointment would, by implication, be necessary. 114 Re-
jecting this argument, the Court decided special qualification require-
ments alone do not indicate congressional intent to create a separate
office. 115 The Court further recognized such implication is unneces-
sary because Congress had spoken to the issue, previously specifying
those positions which do, and those positions which do not, require a
second appointment by the President.116 Specifically, the Court noted
that the language of the Code cites positions to which officers may be
"detailed" or "assigned" without any mention of a second appoint-
ment.117 Military judges are "detailed" by their respective Judge Ad-
vocate General." 8 Thus, the Court declined to infer a requirement of
a second appointment for military judges.
Petitioners' second argument was that the Appointments Clause
itself required an additional appointment. In support of their posi-
tion, Petitioners cited three earlier Supreme Court decisions." 9
Although the cases cited by Petitioners established the classification
of a military judge as an officer, they did not, according to the Court,
address whether the Appointments Clause requires an additional
appointment. 120
More specifically, the Court turned to the consideration given to
Shoemaker v. United States,'2' by both the Court of Military Appeals
and the parties in the present case. At issue in Shoemaker was a stat-
ute enacted by Congress that established a five person commission to
oversee the development of a national park. Three of the members of
the commission were appointed in accordance with Article II-in
other words, they had received two appointments-but the remaining
two members were already military "officers" at the time they were
114. Brief of Petitioners at 18, Weiss (No. 92-1482).
115. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 757.
116. Id. at 757-58. The Court listed several positions that do not require a second appoint-
ment as high level positions: Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief
and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant and Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps, Surgeons General of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Chief of Naval Personnel, Chief of
Chaplains, and the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Id.
117. Id. at 758 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (1988)).
118. Id. Military judges are "detail[ed]" to each general court-martial and may be "de-
tail[ed]" to a special courts-martial. For assignment to a general court-martial, a judge must be
designated by the JAG, but for assignment to a special court-martial, the relevant Service Secre-
tary regulates the manner of appointment. Id.
119. Brief for Petitioners at 14-15, Weiss (No. 92-1482) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S.Ct. 2631 (1991); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
120. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 758.
121. Id. (citing Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1898)).
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chosen for the commission. 122 The Court found that the two military
officers did not need to receive a second appointment because the
new duties were "germane" to the offices they already held. Thus,
where an officer's new duties are "germane" to her existing duties,
"Congress may increase the power and duties . . . without thereby
rendering it necessary that the incumbent should be again nominated
and appointed."'1 23 The Court pointed out the difference in the sup-
porting argument of Shoemaker-that Congress delegated new duties
to two existing offices, each held by a single officer, thus raising the
potential of Congress "circumventing" the Appointments Clause. 124
In Weiss, however, the same danger does not exist. Congress is not
attempting to fill a particular office with any particular officer.
Rather, the statute permits an unspecified number of military judges
who could be appointed from the hundred or perhaps thousands of
qualified commissioned officers. 125 Therefore, the Court concluded,
germaneness analysis is not even necessary in this case.
Moreover, were it necessary to apply the principles of germane-
ness, the Court maintained that the test would be satisfied with re-
spect to military judges.' 26 Although the Court acknowledged the
changes made to the military justice system since 1950 make it more
"civilianized," it reaffirmed the long-standing idea that the military
justice system "remains a 'specialized society separate from civilian
society.""' 127 Further, the military justice system is one in which all
military officers, not just military judges, play a role. 28
In addition, the capacity in which a military judge serves is less
defined than that of a civilian judge. For example, military trial judges
act only when they are detailed to a court-martial 29 and military ap-
pellate judges act only when assigned to a Court of Military Review.
Furthermore, military judges do not enjoy a fixed term and may even
122. Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at 282. One of the officers was the Chief of Engineers of the Army
while the other was the Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia. Id.
123. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 759 (quoting Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at 300-01).
124. Id. The Court in Shoemaker described the argument as being that "while Congress may
create an office, it cannot appoint the officer." Id.
125. Id
126. Id
127. Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
128. The Court gave various examples of the role military officers play in the scheme of
military justice. For example, officers have the authority to dispel arguments among military
servicepersons and to apprehend those who take part in such disturbances. They may also im-
pose "non-judicial" punishment which may include: restricting a servicemember's movement,
suspending a servicemember from duty, forfeiting a week's pay, and imposing extra duties for up
to two weeks. ld. (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 807(c), 815).
129. Id. (citing United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J. 224, 228 (C.M.A. 1992).
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perform other functions while serving as a judge. Accordingly, the
role of a military judge is "germane" to the duties of any military
officer. 130
2. The Due Process Challenge
Having concluded that a second appointment is neither required
by Congressional intention nor by the language of the Appointments
Clause itself, the Court addressed the potential due process challenge.
Petitioners argued that the Due Process Clause required a fixed term,
but not life tenure, for military judges. 131 Conceding that the military
must abide by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Court then went on to reaffirm the traditional approach taken by
courts, affording "particular deference to the determination of Con-
gress"'1 32 in evaluating military policies to determine the appropriate
level of due process.' 33
It is well established that due process requires a fair trial, and a
fair trial requires an impartial judge.134 Petitioners, therefore, argued
that without a fixed term of office, military judges are not sufficiently
impartial.135 The Court, however, did not find support in either his-
torical or present practice to support the argument that military
judges lack the level of independence necessary to ensure
impartiality.136
Historically, the Court explained, fixed terms have never been a
part of military justice. In fact, military judges in their present form
did not even exist in the United States until 1968.137 The Court also
found the ongoing maintenance of the present system "suggests the
130. Id at 760.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25,43 (1976) (holding the right to counsel in a
summary courts-martial to not be mandated by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause)).
133. Id.
134. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 761 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
135. Brief of Petitioners at 22-33, Weiss (No. 92-1482). Petitioners cited three different meth-
ods used to determine terms of office for judges in the federal government. The first are life-
tenured Article III judges. Petitioners did not assert any right to such status for military trial and
appellate judges. Second, Petitioners referred to the class of person serving federal judicial func-
tions with specified terms of office, such as Court of Military Appeals, magistrate and tax court
judges. Finally, Petitioners reach the third class of judges which includes military trial and appel-
late judges, special trial judges of the Tax Court and administrative judges. It is this last group of
judges who lack any fixed term of office, and thus, "their independence is always open to sub-
stantial doubt." Id. at 22-23.
136. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 761.
137. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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absence of a fundamental fairness problem."'1 38 While acknowledging
that the mere existence of a practice does not automatically guarantee
an absence of a due process violation, the Court also noted that Con-
gress has continually made changes to the military justice system, yet
never deemed it necessary to grant tenure to military judges. 139
Discarding both the government's and Petitioners' proposed
tests, 140 the Court found that military policies require a higher level of
judicial deference than their civilian counterparts, 141 a difference justi-
fied by the Constitution's delegation to Congress of control over the
military. 142 This high level of deference extends even to treatment of
servicemembers' constitutional rights. 43 Thus, the Court applied the
standard set forth in Middendorf. "[W]hether the factors militating in
favor of... (the particular right) ... are so extraordinarily weighty as
to overcome the balance struck by Congress."'144
Thus, the only remaining question was whether a fixed term is a
factor of such significance as to upset the balance Congress has set;
the historical treatment of life tenure becomes part of the equation.
Quickly finding fixed terms to be just one way of ensuring judicial
impartiality, the Court evaluated those provisions of the Code that
also serve to protect judicial independence.
Article 26 of the Code, for example, places a military judge under
the authority of the JAG, 45 not the officer who convened the court-
martial. The Court referred to the structure of the military as requir-
ing accountability to superiors. Under this analysis, the balance struck
between accountability and independence is appropriate because the
JAG has no interest in the outcome of a particular case.'4 6 Moreover,
Article 26 prevents a convening or commanding officer from evaluat-
ing a military judge in so far as the judge's military duties are con-
138. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 761-62 (quoting United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450, 462 (C.M.A.
1992).
139. Id. at 762.
140. Id. at 760. Petitioners sought to apply the due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), while the government urged the test set forth in Medina v. Califor-
nia, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992). Id.
141. ld. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981)). In fact, the Court cited the
Rostker language that judicial deference is "at its apogee" when evaluating military cases. Id. at
760-61.
142. Id. at 760 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983)) (Congress has "plenary
control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment,
including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline.").
143. Id. at 761 (citing Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1987)).
144. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976).




cemed.147 In addition, Article 37 of the Code prohibits a convening
authority from reprimanding a military judge regarding performance
of judicial duties, 48 and violations of this provision are punishable by
courts-martial. 49
Specific restraints on judges may also be found in the Code. For
instance, a military judge may not take part in a case in which he has
been previously involved.' 50 An accused may challenge a military
judge or member of a court-martial panel for cause under Article
41.151 Finally, perched atop the military hierarchy is the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals, made up of five civilian judges who serve as the ultimate
protectors of justice in the military.' 52
Based on these various provisions, the Court found that military
judges were sufficently "independent" and found the need for fixed
terms was not "so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance
achieved by Congress."'153 Therefore, having found neither a violation
of the Appointments Clause nor the Due Process Clause, the Court
unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the modern system of mil-
itary justice.' 54
D. Concurring Opinions
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the Court's decision but wrote sep-
arately to emphasize several points. First, she noted that the Court
took special care in evaluating the issues and, thus, protected ser-
vicemembers' constitutional rights.1 55 Second, she maintained that
the modern military justice system is more responsive to due process
concerns, citing the requirement of legal training for today's military
lawyers and judges.'5 6 Finally, she asserted that the Court had done
147. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 826).
148. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 837).
149. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 898).
150. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 826(c), 866(h)).
151. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 841). Article 41 states, "The military judge and members of a
general or special court-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial counsel for cause
stated to the court." 10 U.S.C. § 841.
152. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 762. The Court further observed the "vigilance" undertaken by the
Court of Military Appeals in examining and ruling on instances of improper command influence
over military judges. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Mabe, 33 M.J. 200 (C.M.A. 1991) (finding the
power of the JAG of the Navy to rate military judges based on the appropriateness of the judge's
courts-martial sentences improper); United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450,465 (C.M.A. 1992) (hold-
ing that the JAG could not decertify or transfer a military judge based on the General's opinion
of the appropriateness of the judge's findings and sentences).
153. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 763.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 769 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
156. Id.
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justice to the issues in the instant case,157 in accordance with their
function of ensuring
that the men and women constituting our Armed Forces are treated
as honored members of society whose rights do not turn on the
charity of a military commander .... A member of the Armed
Forces is entitled to equal justice under law not as conceived by the
generosity of a commander but as written in the Constitution
158
Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia
found Justice Rehnquist's opinion needed more Appointments Clause
analysis and less Due Process analysis. Justice Scalia found that the
Court's conclusion that "germaneness" need not be evaluated did not
logically follow the Court's attempt to distinguish Shoemaker from the
instant case. Thus, Justice Scalia set forth a different approach to ap-
plying the germaneness test.159 In Justice Scalia's opinion, germane-
ness analysis should take place whenever an Appointments Clause
violation is at issue. Thus, the analysis would be applied not only
when Congress itself "appropriates" appointment power by conferring
new duties, but also when Congress grants others, such as the JAG,
the power to confer new duties. 16° Under this analysis, granting the
JAG the power of appointment would violate Article II if the JAG's
new duties were nongermane. Like the rest of the Court, however,
Justice Scalia found that the new duties of a military judge are ger-
mane to the duties of a military officer.161
Addressing the Court's due process analysis, Justice Scalia found
it neither necessary nor appropriate for the Court to determine
whether Congress has effectuated a proper balance between judicial
independence and the military chain-of-command. Citing Justice
Rehnquist's findings of sufficient Code protections of judicial inde-
pendence, Justice Scalia admitted that similar protections would not
satisfy due process in a civilian justice system. However, using an
original intent point of view, Justice Scalia was satisfied that a fixed
term had never been a part of the scheme of military justice. Thus, for
Justice Scalia, history was not just a part of the equation, but rather,
was the conclusive grounds on which the Court could decide the due
process aspect of this case.162
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57, 59-60 (1968) (Douglas, J., opinion in
chambers)).
159. Id. at 770 (Scalia, J., concurring).
- 160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 771 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Justice Souter also wrote a concurring opinion, elaborating on the
Appointments Clause aspects of the decision.163 By way of clarifica-
tion, Justice Souter wrote to explain why military judges are inferior
officers under the Appointments Clause. The language "officers of
the United States" in the Appointments Clause refers to principal of-
ficers' 64 who require appointment by the President and approval by
Congress. However, the Clause also permits Congress to grant the
power to appoint inferior officers to the President alone, Heads of
Departments, or the courts without Congressional approval.' 65 Stat-
ing that military officers in general are recognized as inferior officers,
Justice Souter explained that the constitutional and legislative histo-
ries also confirmed that military judges are inferior officers. 166 Thus,
the strict requirements for appointment of principal officers is not nec-
essary for military judges, and Congress has legitimately granted ap-
pointment power to the JAG.' 67
IV. ANALYSIS: A THREAT TO SERVICEMEMBERS'
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
While servicemembers may have some limits on their individual
rights, in reality, the military system is conceived to provide more
rights in some ways than the civilian justice system. The only right
from which servicemembers are expressly excluded is the right to in-
dictment by a grand jury.168 In fact, in some ways, the protection of
individual rights was advanced earlier in the military than in civilian
courts. For instance, the historic Miranda decision was decided subse-
quent to the enactment of Article 31 of the Code.
It is the very nature of the military establishment that requires
careful and consistent protection of servicemembers' rights. The po-
tential for abuse in a hierarchical system like the military led this na-
tion's founders to specifically provide for civilian checks on the power
of the military establishment. Thus, when military justice poses seri-
ous threats to individual rights, it is imperative that the Supreme
Court be able and willing to curtail the potential for abuse.
163. Id. at 763 (Souter, J., concurring).
164. Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,670 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132
(1976)).
165. U.S. CONsT. art. 2, § 2.
166. For Justice Souter's in depth discussion, see Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 764-69 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
167. Id. at 769.
168. See infra, note 196. Even though servicemembers are subject to inspections, thus de-
priving them of some degree of privacy, these inspections must be reasonable.
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In Weiss, however, the Court's lengthy yet elusive evaluation of
the military justice system does little to alleviate potential dangers
posed to servicemembers' rights under the present system. The deci-
sion adds nothing to the existing body of judicial treatment of military
issues, nor does it look beyond the superficial justification of the mili-
tary's "separate society" to evaluate the effect that standard has on
the rights of servicemembers.
A. The Cost of Judicial Dependence-the Potential for Partiality
The Court in Weiss incorrectly held that military judges do not
need the same protections afforded to civilian judges to ensure their
independence. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, failed to take
notice that the military chain-of-command still affords the potential
for abuse. A military judge, at least at the trial and first appellate
level, serves at the discretion of the Judge Advocate General, the indi-
vidual who is the senior military officer in each department of the
military.169 The potential for abuse in this situation is obvious. For
instance, a general may determine that a major's decisions are nega-
tively affecting discipline and call the Judge Advocate General. This
action would likely result in that major's removal from the role of
judge. 170 The Judge Advocate General, the "boss," is also responsible
for writing the officer's annual efficiency report.171 There can be little
doubt this evaluation process could have an effect on the military
judges' decisions.172 Not only does the JAG have the power to assign
judges, to evaluate their performance, and to rotate them to another
post, but that same JAG Corp appoints and supervises the prosecuting
attorneys. 73
169. Joseph H. Baum & Kevin J. Barry, United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military
Review v. Carlucci: A Question of Judicial Independence, 36 FED. B. NEws & J. 242, 242 (1989)
(citing Rule for Courts Martial 109, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNrrED STATES 1984)).
170. Interview of Jonathan P. Tomes, Visiting Associate Professor of Legal Writing at Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, in Chicago, IL (May 25, 1994) (U.S.
Army, retired).
171. Interview with Jonathan P. Tomes, Visiting Associate Professor of Legal Writing at Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, in Chicago, IL (Jan. 14, 1994) (U.S.
Army, retired). This authority of the JAG over military judges is, in effect, analogous to the
Attorney General writing evaluations on all federal district court judges. Id.
172. Interview with Michael I. Spak, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illi-
nois Institute of Technology, in Chicago, IL (Jan. 19, 1994) (U.S. Army, retired).
173. Basically then, a military judge owes his job and next assignment to the prosecution.
Putting Military Style Justice on Trial, AM. LAW MEDIA, May 12, 1993.
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While the pressure of this system may not be a problem for the
majority of judges, 174 it is the possibility of influence that may violate
due process. In fact, the Supreme Court has previously called even
the "temptation to... a judge to forget the burden of proof required
to convict the defendant" a violation of due process. 175 The mere
existence of cases alleging unlawful command influence suggests that
military judges may be so tempted. For example, military judges may
be lured into deciding cases in such a way as to promote their own
careers.176 Because military judges' objectivity and independence are
not guaranteed by tenure and salary protections, it is impossible for
the Court to deny that the "possibility of influence" exists. 177
This "potential" is more that a theoretical possibility. In United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review v. Carlucci,178 for
example, the potential problems of dependent military judges came to
fruition. In that case, the Navy Inspector General felt that improper
influence had been applied toward the Court of Military Review
judges in connection with their review of a court-martial conviction.
Furthermore, the Court of Military Review itself petitioned the Court
of Military Appeals to prevent the Inspector General from proceeding
with the investigation. Apparently, the JAG of the Navy had given
the Chief Judge of the Court of Military Review a direct order to make
all of the judges, court personnel, and internal court materials avail-
able to the Inspector General for questioning and inspection (and the
Supreme Court in Weiss says the JAG has no interest in the outcome
of a particular case). 179 The Court of Military Appeals recognized the
seriousness of the situation; had the Chief Judge of the military review
court refused to comply with the JAG's direct order, he could have
been tried by court-martial and subjected to dismissal, confined to
hard labor for five years, and forfeited pay and allowances. 180
Although the Court of Military Appeals granted relief to the Court of
Military Review in the form of a protective order, 181 this case illus-
174. Interview with Jonathan P. Tomes, supra note 170. Professor Tomes attests to the fact
that concerns about fitness evaluations and promotions probably do not affect most judges. This
is due to the fact that entering the judiciary is not necessarily a good career move in the military
as it is not likely to result in opportunities for quick advancement. Thus, the type of people who
enter the judiciary are less likely to be concerned with offending commanding officers. Id.
175. Tlimey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
176. Military Justice and Article III, supra note 54, at 1920.
177. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 215, 219 (1949).
178. 26 M.J. 328 (C.M.A. 1988).
179. Id. at 329.
180. Id. at 333.
181. Id. at 342.
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trates the potential for influence and the serious considerations a mili-
tary judge may face when deciding a case-considerations that go
beyond the consequences a decision will have on the accused to the
consequences a decision will have on the judge.
Furthermore, a military judge's future career is not influenced
solely by the JAG's evaluations. Military promotions are ultimately
decided by selection boards that do not consist solely of JAG officers.
Thus, officers whose actions were previously condemned by a military
judge may later sit on the very review board that determines whether
the particular judge gets promoted. This potential for irregular pro-
motion decisions became a reality for at least one army officer, and in
fact became an impetus for a Senate investigation of the promotion
selection process. 182 In 1982, the Commanding General of the 3d Ar-
mored Division of the Army made a series of speeches to members of
that Division. In essence, the speeches influenced the actions of of-
ficers and non-commissioned officers with respect to courts-martial
proceedings within the division. Those speeches were later found to
constitute improper command influence. 183
Between 1989 and 1990, the nomination of several officers for
promotion, officers that were involved in those instances of improper
command influence, prompted a Senate investigation of the Army's
promotion selection process. For instance, Colonel John R. Bozeman,
who had served as Staff Judge Advocate of the 3d Armored Division
during the aforementioned speeches, was on the promotion selection
board for an army major. Apparently, Colonel Bozeman had previ-
ously attempted to influence the actions of a major who had served as
appellate defense counsel in the command influence cases. Colonel
Bozeman later sat on the review board that declined to promote the
major. The Army Board for Correction of Military Records subse-
quently found that Colonel Bozeman should not have been a member
of the selection board, and ordered promotion of the major to lieuten-
ant colonel. 184 As a result of this and other events, the nominations
for the promotion of several high ranking JAG Corp officers were
withdrawn. 8 5
182. SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF ISSUES CON-
CERNING NOMINATIONS FOR GENERAL OFFICER POSITIONS IN THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN-
ERAL'S CORPS, U.S. ARMY, S. REP. No. 102-1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. AL As a result of these events, one nomination for promotion to brigadier general and a
nomination for the position of JAG were returned to the President at the end of the 1st Session
of the 101st Congress and the end of the 101st Congress, respectively, and were not resubmitted
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The military itself recognizes the potential danger of unlawful
command influence and that it could threaten the military justice sys-
tem.186 In a policy memorandum to judge advocates, the army states
that unlawful command influence is detrimental to "order, discipline,
morale, and unit cohesiveness.' 187 Coincidentally, these are the same
characteristics upon which the military relies as justification for main-
taining a separate system of justice. In theory, the military recognizes
that "even the appearance" of unlawful command influence can -affect
the public's perception of military justice. 88 In practice, however, the
military shuns the use of procedural safeguards that would ensure
fairness.
The fact that all officers play a role in military justice poses an
additional threat to servicemembers' due process rights. For instance,
a commander who convenes a court-martial proceeding also has the
authority to select the members of the jury.18 9 Technically, the only
requirement with which the commander must comply in choosing jury
members is that they be the "best qualified for the duty by reason of
age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial
temperament.'9 Thus, the commander of the accused may also be
the commander of the jury members. The danger in allowing such
wide latitude may manifest itself in two ways. 191 First, the members of
the jury may feel compelled to convict the accused in order to gain
favor with the commander. 192 Second, the commander may select jury
members based on their disposition to the case. 193 Under either scen-
ario, the possibility of prejudice to the accused is unjustifiable. There-
fore, this method of jury selection constitutes an "insurmountable"
obstacle to fairness in military courts-martial proceedings. 194
by the President. In addition, two other nominations for brigadier general were withdrawn by
the President. Id.
186. Memorandum from Acting JAG to All Staff and Command Judge Advocates and Su-
pervising Judge Advocates (April 1990) (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-208, reprinted in
William K. Sutter, Unlawful Command Influence-Policy Memorandum 90-1, ARMY LAW. (Apr.




189. Schlueter, supra note 77, at 19.
190. Heil, supra note 83, at 751 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-




194. Interview with Michael I. Spak, supra note 172. Professor Spak believes the system is
"clearly less fair" than the civilian system of criminal justice, and cites two things which make the
military system patently unfair. The first is the jury selection process. Obviously, by using this
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Notwithstanding the integrity of military commanders, it is impossible
to avoid at least the appearance of impropriety. 195
B. Extreme Deference-The Supreme Court's Touchstone
The former Court of Military Appeals once said that the Bill of
Rights applies to servicemembers "unless any given protection is, ex-
pressly or by necessary implication, inapplicable."' 6 Only one pro-
tection of the Bill of Rights, the requirement of indictment by a grand
jury, is made "expressly" inapplicable to servicemembers. 197 As this
discussion will point out, however, servicemembers have been denied
the protection of several other provisions of the Bill of Rights, by
"necessary implication."'1 98
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has displayed a "hands off" atti-
tude toward military matters, 199 and the Weiss decision is certainly no
exception. Seldom has the Court found a military practice unconstitu-
tional.200 Although the Court has shown reluctance toward unlimited
military power,20' its decisions have also reflected a great deal of def-
erence to the military's authority over its personnel.202 In Rostker v.
process one can predict the outcome of a trial. Second, he pointed to the existence of ineffective
defense counsel. This deficiency he attributes to the fact that accused persons in the civilian
world often have the assistance of defense counsel who devote their careers to working as public
defenders. Good military defense counsel, on the other hand, are promoted to supervisory posi-
tions, leaving only the young, inexperienced JAG officers to defend servicemembers. Id.
195. Schlueter, supra note 77, at 20.
196. United States v. Middleton, 10 M.J. 123, 126 (C.M.A. 1981). See also United States v.
Ezell, 6 MJ. 307 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960).
197. U.S. CONST., amend. V. The requirement of indictment by grand jury is not extended to
military cases.
198. Middleton, 10 M.J. at 126-28 n.5. A service member's reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment is diminished. Id. at 127 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743
(1974)). Also, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel does
not apply to a servicemember in the summary court-martial, since it is not a "criminal prosecu-
tion." Id. (citing Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976)).
199. Warren, supra note 26, at 254-55. See also Levin, supra note 22, at 1056, where the
author states that the Court has consistently deferred to the military on issues limiting ser-
vicemembers' liberty. See, eg., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (the Court
denied a free speech claim by a Jewish officer who was prohibited from wearing his yarmulke in
uniform); Parker, 417 U.S. at 744 (the Court applied a separate standard for the military); Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357-58 (1980) (the Court denied both statutory and constitutional free
speech challenges to Air Force regulations requiring prior approval of a commanding officer
before a servicemember could circulate petitions of any kind).
200. The Court did disallow expatriation as a method of maintaining discipline. Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958).
201. Heil, supra note 83, at 735 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955) (the military was prevented from extending its jurisdiction to ex-military ser-
vicemembers); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (the military was prevented from asserting
jurisdiction over dependents of military personnel).
202. In Burns v. Wilson, the Court stated that courts-martial proceedings can be challenged
through habeas corpus proceedings in civil courts if the defendant was denied fundamental
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Goldberg,20 3 for instance, the Court denied a challenge that President
Carter's reinstatement of the draft constituted gender discrimination.
The Court in Goldberg specifically stated that when dealing with mili-
tary affairs, "the Court [has] accorded Congress [great] deference." 2°4
This tradition of deference also reflects the Court's belief that they are
ill-equipped to understand military needs, and thus should leave such
questions to Congress and the military.205 The Weiss Court blindly
followed that tradition. Taking the easy way out, the Court gave mere
lip service to the requirement that the military abide by the Fifth
Amendment, but then proceeded to apply an artificially elevated level
of deference to Congress' determination of the military's individual
brand of due process.
The Weiss Court's misconception is based on an inaccurate view
of the military's role in modem society. Today's military establish-
ment constitutes a large part of our nation's economy. It is, in fact, a
business, with the majority of its members serving in noncombat sup-
port roles.206 No specialized knowledge is necessary to understand
the basic workings of the modern military. Thus, in light of today's
enormous and bureaucratic military, the Court's "unthinking defer-
ence ... is misplaced" 20 7 and outdated.
The Supreme Court's highly deferential standard of judicial re-
view, and subsequent refusal to extend constitutional rights doctrine
to the military,20 8 has had some other disturbing repercussions. Of
particular interest are the Court's virtual removal of a remedy in cases
where a servicemember's constitutional rights have been assailed, and
its expansion of court-martial jurisdiction.
1. Limited Access to the Courtroom
In a line of cases from 1950 to 1987, the Supreme Court systemat-
ically dispensed with servicemembers' opportunities to secure a rem-
rights. 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953). Nevertheless, this decision has been read to bestow a limited
right, thereby recognizing judicial deference to the military. Henderson, supra note 20, at 143.
203. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
204. Id. at 64-65.
205. Warren, supra note 26, at 255. See also Solorio v. United States, where the Court stated
that civil courts are "ill equipped" to deal with military matters. 483 U.S. 435, 448 (1987).
206. Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell to Stanley: Three Strikes and Servicemembers are
Out, 25 U. RicH. L. REV. 93, 130 (1990).
207. Levin, supra note 22, at 1059. The remainder of this discussion is postponed for the
section on the system's failure to evolve.
208. Id. at 1013.
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edy when deprived of their constitutional rights by their superiors.209
While the Supreme Court has affirmed the existence of constitutional
rights for servicemembers, it has also found those rights to be limited
by the needs of the military. Thus, we have again returned to the view
that "military necessity," and the Court's unwillingness to interfere
with the methods of military discipline, will prevail over constitutional
rights.210
In Feres v. United States,21 servicemembers brought an action
against the military under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The
Court in Feres declined to apply the waiver of sovereign immunity for
tortious acts committed by agents and employees of the government
to cases brought against the military. Rather, the Supreme Court de-
clined to allow servicemembers a cause of action against the military
based on three grounds. First, the Court found that the FTCA did not
create any new causes of action. Thus, since servicemembers had no
cause of action before its enactment, the FTCA did not bestow on
them any new right to a cause of action.212 Second, because ser-
vicemembers do not determine their own geographical situation, the
Court determined liability for their injuries could not be based on the
law of the state in which the tort was committed. Finally, the Supreme
Court felt that because servicemembers had an already existing rem-
edy for their injuries, a new cause of action was not necessary.21 3
The Court's rationale was taken a step further in Chappell, where
servicemembers were denied monetary damages from their superiors
for constitutional tort violations. 21 4 Using "separate society" ratio-
nales, the Court cited both special factors of the military discipline
structure and Congress' activity in the area to find that it was ill-
equipped to deal with the issue, and thus, allowing remedies would be
inappropriate. 215
The Stanley decision took the final step in denying ser-
vicemembers redress for torts committed against them. Stanley had
been negligently administered LSD by the military. Nevertheless, the
209. Tomes, supra note 206, at 93. See also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
210. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300. Thus, the Court has reaffirmed the need for distinct regula-
tions that serve the goals of military discipline justifying an exclusive system of military justice.
211. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
212. Tomes, supra note 206, at 97.
213. 1d




Court denied servicemembers a remedy for constitutional tort injuries
resulting from military service.216
Despite the Court's rationalization based on the need for disci-
pline and a resulting strong national defense, the results are over-
reaching. While it is true that servicemembers rights are limited, it
does not mean they should be entirely eliminated.217 Discipline is best
achieved through noncoercive methods, but eliminating ser-
vicemembers' chances at redress gives military commanders a free
hand.218 In addition, such a limitation of rights is not necessary to
enforce discipline. Military courts already have unlimited subject
matter jurisdiction, thus subjecting servicemembers to an entrenched
system of discipline.219
2. The Expansion of Court-martial Jurisdiction
The ongoing debate over the proper jurisdiction of military trial
courts goes back to the 17th Century.2 20 The British Articles of War
gave military courts jurisdiction over both military and civilian of-
fenses,221 as did the 1776 American Articles of War.222 The Framers,
however, were wary of military jurisdiction.22 3 It was this distrust that
led the Framers to delegate to Congress the power to make rules for
the military,224 in hope that civilian society would maintain a system of
checks on military power.
However, from 1866 to 1960, despite the concern for limiting mil-
itary power, court-martial jurisdiction was based solely on military sta-
tus.225 Thus, a servicemember could be tried by court-martial for any
crime, even one unrelated to his status in the military. For an eighteen
year period, from 1969 to 1987, the court reigned in the authority of
216. Id. at 102-03.
217. Id. at 105-06.
218. Id. at 108.
219. Id. at 112.
220. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 446 (1987).
221. Id. at 443 (citing British Articles of War of 1774 § XIV, art. XVI, reprinted in G. DAVIS,
MLITARY LAW OF THE UNrED STATES 581, 589 (3d rev. ed. 1915)).
222. Id. at 444 (citing American Articles of War of 1776, § XVII, art. 5, reprinted in 2 WN.
Tnmop 1503).
223. Levin, supra note 22, at 1016. It was exactly the separate standard type of review, used
by the Supreme Court today, that made the Framers wary of expansive jurisdiction of military
courts. See also Solorio, 483 U.S. at 455 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the framers were
"wary of military jurisdiction" and also asserting that the British were suspicious of courts-mar-
tial jurisdiction in the 17th and 18th Centuries).
224. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 441.
225. Id. at 439 (citing Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1973)). Late 18th Century trial by
courts-martial for civilian offenses is also referenced in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 278
n. 3 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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courts-martial judges by imposing the "service connection" test.226
Under this test, off-base conduct without any connection to the mili-
tary could not be tried by a court-martial proceeding.227
By 1987, both civilian and military trial courts had found it in-
creasingly difficult to draw the line between crimes that were con-
nected to military service and those that were not. Accordingly, the
Court again addressed the scope of court-martial jurisdiction, and on
reevaluation, overruled the service-connection test rule.228 Again the
Court professed its inability to understand the workings of the mili-
tary as a justification for the application of a higher standard of defer-
ence. In so doing, the Court let loose the jurisdictional constraints of
courts-martial proceedings in an action that Justice Marshall referred
to as evidencing "contempt both for the members of our Armed
Forces and for the constitutional safeguards intended to protect us
all.,,229
The broad jurisdictional reach of military trial courts could cer-
tainly not have been justified had the courts adhered to the dictates of
history. Nevertheless, the Court in Weiss used history as a major justi-
fication for its decision that military judges do not need a fixed term to
protect their independence. 230 The Court pointed to changes to the
system of military justice, and the absence of a fixed term as one of
those changes, to infer that because fixed terms were never a part of
the system of military justice, due process does not so require. The
Court's rationale is analogous to saying that because we did not have
Miranda rights before 1966, those rights are not required by due pro-
cess. This logical gap evidences the Court's attempt to apply a high
level of judicial deference to a system no longer in need of such a
standard.
C. The Failure to Evolve
Neither the system, nor the Supreme Court's treatment of it, re-
flect the needs of a military that is substantially different from the one
226. Military Justice and Article III, supra note 54, at 1915-16.
227. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 274.
228. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 436. The facts of the case centered around the sexual abuse of two
young girls by a Coast Guard Yeoman First Class. One instance of abuse had taken place in his
private home and the other on a military post. The girls were the daughters of another Coast
Guardsman. Thus, the Court of Military Appeals found that the service connection test was
satisfied. It at 437-38.
229. Id. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230. Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 753 (1994). For Justice Scalia, history would be
the determinate factor. itt at 771 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also discussion supra Part III(c)(2).
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our Founders created. While the Court has empowered the military
justice system with far-reaching authority over the conduct of ser-
vicemembers, it has failed to extend to those servicemembers the de-
velopments in civilian due process doctrine. Due to the changing
nature of the military forces, this exclusion of servicemembers from
constitutional protections is simply unjustified.
1. The Realities of Today's Military Establishment
When the Founders debated the role of the military in the new
nation, their concerns centered around preventing the growth of a
large, expensive and powerful military. At the time, military justice
consisted simply of courts-martial proceedings, and the system ex-
tended only to the small colonial army.231 Even then, some of the
Founders were opposed to court-martial jurisdiction in times of
peace.232 The situation is much different today.
Servicemembers are specifically excluded from the right to grand
jury indictment, and over the years, much discourse has been spent to
determine the status of their other constitutional rights. In addition,
the modem military establishment is a major arm of the government,
with a judicial system which extends to 1.5 million active duty
servicemembers. 233
Certainly the founders did not foresee a modem military of such
enormous proportions. Hence, the debate continues about the role
this establishment should play in our modem society. What controls
the civilian populace should have over this "separate society" and its
system of justice continues to be a controversial issue.
2. What this Growth Means to Military Justice
In addition to the expansive size and reach of the military,
changes have also occurred in the composition of the forces. During
World Wars I and II, and especially during Korea and Vietnam, there
existed a great deal of opposition to our country's involvement in for-
eign wars.234 While such opposition was not new, hostile political op-
position to both the Vietnam war, and the draft, led to a more
231. Wiener, supra note 55, at 177. Furthermore, the Articles of War extended courts-mar-
tial jurisdiction only to military offenses. Id& at 177-78.
232. Henderson, supra note 20, at 149. During the ratification debates, George Mason as-
serted an interest in codifying the applicability of courts-martials only in time of war. I&
233. Murawski, supra note 35.
234. Hirschhorn, supra note 82, at 177.
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emotional anti-war movement than had occurred in the past.235 As a
result, the ranks included many "politically hostile individuals" with a
willingness to attack the authority of their chain of command, espe-
cially over issues concerning their individual rights.236 Unlike the mil-
itary of Vietnam, today's military is an all volunteer force.
Consequently, the need for disciplinary action is less frequent because
servicemembers are in the military by choice.237
The decreased need for formal disciplinary action leads to fewer
cases, which, in turn, leads to less experienced lawyers. Whereas a
JAG defense counselor once tried approximately 5-8 cases per week,
they currently try only that many per year. Thus, a servicemember is
often deprived of qualified counsel.238
Moreover, the growth of the military has posed some unique
problems in the application of constitutional guarantees. 239 A peace-
time military force makes different demands on a justice system, de-
mands that have nothing to do with order and discipline. Thus, the
inordinately high standard of judicial deference, so ardently clung to
by the Supreme Court in military matters, is no longer appropriate. 240
This is not to say that military justice is bankrupt. Congress has,
in fact, extended some constitutional protections to servicemembers
by statute. 241 Additionally some would argue that if one could assure
competent counsel and only lawful command influence, the military
system could actually be more fair than the civilian.242 As it stands
however, military personnel accused of crimes are getting the "worst
of all possible worlds." 243
235. Id.
236. Id
237. Interview with Jonathan P. Tomes, supra note 170. As an example, Professor Tomes
cites the decrease in the amount of drug crimes committed in the armed forces today as com-
pared to the high number during the Vietnam era. Id.
238. Id. This statistic is based on interviewee's personal experience as military defense coun-
sel and a military judge. For a contrary view, Professor Spak stated that military lawyers today
are just as experienced as those of the past. Regardless of the number of crimes, Spak states that
the majority of defense and prosecution counsel in the military consists of lawyers fresh out of
law school. After a given period of time, they are then rotated out of their positions or pro-
moted to supervisory roles. Thus, he would conclude that military counsel has always been of a
lower standard than civilian counsel since only the young lawyers serve in these positions in the
military. Interview with Michael T. Spak, supra note 172.
239. Warren, supra note 26, at 257.
240. Id. at 260. Justice Warren recognized that with a peacetime army, the need for military
deference would not be as great.
241. Wiener, supra note 55, at 237. Some of these protections include: assistance of counsel,
protection against self-incrimination, protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and
protection against subjection to double jeopardy. Id




To the further discredit of the system, the expansion of the Bill of
Rights in the civilian courts2" has not been carried over into military
justice. It is time for the Supreme Court to abandon its touchstone of
deference and recognize that the "sweeping capacity" of today's mili-
tary justice system creates a need for increased constitutional
safeguards. 245
V. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE
A. Where the Court's Decision Leaves Us
The Court in Weiss correctly recognized that military justice has
come a long way. Just a few decades ago, the system was run by law
officers who lacked any formal legal training. Today's accused have
the advantage of professional lawyers and judges.246 The changes to
date, however, are simply not enough. Although unlawful command
influence is forbidden and punishable under the Code, it remains a
reality-one that puts the rights, and even the freedom, of ser-
vicemembers at risk. The Court in Weiss simply acquiesced to their
traditional, and outdated, standard of extreme deference to Congress;
a standard this Note has argued should be abandoned. In upholding
the current practices of appointing and assigning military judges, the
Court has declined to provide the military justice system with an im-
portant first step toward becoming a system attuned to its modem
status.
Congress, however, has various options available to legitimize the
status of military trial and appellate judges. First, Congress could stat-
utorily provide for a true appointment process for military judges, 247
thereby recognizing their stature as the protectors of justice for ser-
vicemembers. To further increase servicemembers and civilians per-
ception of military justice, Congress could provide for designated
terms of office for military judges. In addition, an absence of effi-
ciency reports, or efficiency reports by other than the JAG would en-
244. Wiener, supra note 55, at 240.
245. Warren, supra note 26, at 255. Justice Warren professes that the subjection of military
courts to the checks of their civilian counterparts will help meet the goal of assuring due process.
Id.
246. For opposing views on the competency of military counsel, see supra note 236 and ac-
companying text.
247. United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J. 224 (C.M.A. 1992). The plurality opinion recognized
Congress' right to require a second appointment for judges and considered it inappropriate for
the courts to make this decision. Specifically, the court expressed its reluctance to consider the
merits of a policy issue.
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sure the independence and impartiality of military officers while they
serve as military judges.
B. What the Weiss Decision Means for Other Issues Confronting
Today's Military
The Court's decision does not speak well for other more public
issues the modern military must face. For the majority of the general
public, military justice is "out of sight, out of mind," which may ex-
plain the unanimous and nonemotional response of the Court in
Weiss. Other more controversial issues, however, do spark popular
interest.
In the aftermath of "Tailhook," 2 48 for instance, the public's per-
ception of military discipline and justice cannot help but be clouded.
The fact is, the Tailhook incident is symptomatic of the problems the
Weiss Court failed to see. The modem military faces the same contro-
versial issues as civilian society-sexual harassment, discrimination,
gays in the military249 and the like. No longer is the military a group
of men blindly following their leader to battle. Today's military is an
enormous business. Its employees come from all walks of life and
carry with them all the social and political ideas of their civilian coun-
terparts. The military, and its justice system, must face these problems
and must have the tools to do so.
248. The Tailhook incident involved allegations of sexual harassment of female naval officers
by male naval officers at an aviator convention. The consequences incident received a great deal
of media attention. Following a Pentagon investigation, the Secretary of the Navy was forced to
step down while other high ranking officers were forced into early retirement. Ultimately, how-
ever, not a single officer was disciplined for involvement in the incident.
249. The issue of gays in the military is one which will certainly continue to plague the mili-
tary justice system. Although the issue is outside the scope of this Note, the reader may want to
consider what the legal consequences of the "don't ask/don't tell" might be.
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